Legislation by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 3 Article 9 
1956 
Legislation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Legislation, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 553 (1956). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
LEGISLATION
BUDGET PLANNING CONTRACTS PROHIBITED
Chapter 31 of the 1956 New York Sessions Laws takes cognizance of an
abusive business practice which has been operated in New York for many years.
It outlaws budget planning to all but attorneys-at-law through the addition to the
Penal Law of sections 410-12.
A number of businesses, conducted throughout New York State as debt
adjustment agencies or budget planners, had the avowed purpose of aiding
debtors in overcoming their financial distress. Whereas legitimate budget plan-
ning companies operate to adjust, settle, compromise or otherwise discharge a
client's debts out of money which the client debtor pays to the adjustor, budget
planning as it was generally practiced in this state fell to such a degrading level
that it was termed an unfair business practice by the Governor of New York1 and
was prohibited by the aforementioned amendment to the Penal Law.2
Prior to 1956, the New York statute books were devoid of laws pertaining to
the regulation of these concerns and they flourished with remarkable success.
The pattern was similar in any well-populated community. Upon opening, the
debt adjustment office would immediately resort to a full-scale advertising cam-
paign, using such appealing slogans as, "Your best bet yet to get out of debt,"
and "Get out of debt, stop borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." Their salesman-
ship efforts were directed at the small wage-earners, both urban and suburban,
who had become burdened with debt. Being pressed by a variety of individual
creditors, a debt-plagued wage earner would in many cases be ready to grasp at
any possible solution to his problems.3 A debt adjustor, or what New York has
chosen to call a budget planner, would offer the service of consolidating the
debtor's outstanding obligations by having the debtor pay to him sums of money
either weekly or monthly; he, in turn, would formulate a plan for paying off the
individual accounts, and would then seek creditor acceptance of the payment
plan. These companies claimed that through these arrangements they could
prevent garnishments, repossessions, levies and other legal actions. The debt
adjustor was in effect nothing more than a paid agent of the debtor who dis-
tributed such funds as the debtor might pay him. Had the adjustors, as a group,
performed this service ethically, the legislature in all likelihood would never have
acted. However, they failed to do so. The more unscrupulous adjustors did not
as a rule disclose their service charges, which ranged anywhere from 15 per cent
to 25 per cent of the debtor's total obligations, plus a bookkeeping charge.4 Many
times their fees were taken out of the first installments paid to them, and cred-
itors almost invariably would not be paid, nor even notified of their debtor's
good-faith attempt to pay, with the result that a debtor would be confronted with
I. Governor's message, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 31.
2. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 410-12.
3. Budget planners had a wide market for their services as nearly half the families in the
United States owe some installment debts. See Fact Sheet Prepared for Mie at the Governor's
Conference on Consumer Debt, Consumer Counsel, Oct. 13, 1954.
4. Bloom, Beware of "Debt Adjustment" Racketeers, Reader's Digest Magazine, Oct. 19S5.
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the very legal actions he had sought to avoid. The debtor would gain nothing,
and in fact would have lost the fees paid. In addition, had he attempted to with-
draw from his contract with the budget planner before the complete fee had been
paid, he was threatened with further litigation.
These practices are effectively blocked by the new amendment, entitled
"Budget Planning," which has added three sections to the Penal Law. The first
section defines budget planning,5 the second prohibits it,0 and the third sets forth
the penalties for violations.7 Attorneys-at-law are specifically excluded from the
above provisions.8
The New York Better Business Bureau as far back as 1954 warned of the
danger of debt adjustment.0 A survey conducted by the St. Louis Better Business
Bureau concluded that debt adjustment agencies were not rendering a public
service.'0 The National Legal Aid Association, through its own publication,
sought to correct this situation." The Attorney General of New York, pending
5. "Definitions. 1. Budget planning, as used in this article, means the making of a con-
tract with a particular debtor whereby the debtor agrees to pay a sum or sums of money
periodically to the person engaged in the budget planning who shall distribute the same
among certain specified creditors in accordance with a plan agreed upon and the debtor
further agrees to pay to such person any valuable consideration for such services or for any
other services rendered in connection therewith.
"2. Person, as used in this article, shall not include a person admitted to practice law In
this state.
"3. Firm, as used in this article, shall not include a co-partnership, all the members of
which are admitted to practice law in this state." N.Y. Penal Law § 410.
6. "Budget planning prohibited. No person, firm, association or corporation, shall, after
the effective date of this act, engage in the business of budget planning as defined in section four
hundred ten of this chapter, but nothing herein contained shall affect any contract thereto-
fore made." N.Y. Penal Law § 411.
7. "Penalty. Whoever either individually or as an officer, director or employee of any
person, firm, association or corporation, violates any of the provisions of section four hundred
eleven of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars and to imprisonment for not more than six months or to
both for each such violation." N.Y. Penal Law § 412.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Better Business Bureau of N.Y.C., Monthly Memo, Oct. 1954.
10. Ninety per cent of the responses to the questionnaires sent out said debt adjustors
were not useful. Ten per cent stated they were useful for some purposes. St. Louis Better
Business Bureau, Debt Adjustors-Are they a Blessing or Burden?, Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1954.
For other articles by the Better Business Bureau on the subject of debt adjustment, see:
Better Business Bureau of Kansas City, Some Complainants Misled by Debt Pro-Rater
Advertising, 33 Bulletin No. 36, Oct. 6, 1954; The Toledo Better Business Bureau, Debt
Pro-Rating Firms Mushroom in this Area, 7 Report No. 1, Jan. 1955; Better Business
Bureau of Los Angeles, "Debt-Adjustors" Copy to be Cleared by BBB, 8 Report No. 22,
Dec. 28, 1955. See also: Conference on Personal Finance Law, Quarterly Report, Summer
1954; Borrowers Are Being Played for Suckers by so-called "Debt-Adjustors" or "Pro-
Raters," CXX American Banker, No. 39, Feb. 28, 1955.
11. Bloom, Debt Adjustment-Meanest Racket Out, XIII Legal Aid Brief Case, No. 5,




passage of the bill under discussion, took action early in 1956 by conducting an
extensive investigation in this field' 2 and subsequently obtained an injuction
restraining the largest company then existing in this state from further
operations.' 3
Opponents of the bill argued that it was too broadly drawn and that many
legitimate commercial organizations would come under the bill's condemnation. 1'
While some revisions within these organizations were necessary, complete
opposition proved unwarranted as they readily adopted their procedures without
adverse effect. 1
New York is not alone in unethical debt adjustment practices.' 0 Legislation
enacted in Maine, Massachusetts and Wisconsin is typical of that adopted or
proposed in other states.17
In Maine, three new sections, very similar to the New York amendment, were
added to chapter 137 of the Maine Revised Statutes, entitled "Crimes Against
Public Health, Safety and Policy."'8 Under the Maine law, however, a person
performing budget planning work gratuitously could be prosecuted. New York
has not gone that far, and, since the real abuse lay in the high charges imposed,
has wisely added the necessity of consideration.
12. See letter from the N.Y. Dept. of Law to The Fordham Law Review, Aug. 13, 1956,
on file with The Fordham Law Review.
13. New York v. Silver Shield System Inc., File No. 40327, Supreme Court, Newr York
County, 1954.
14. "For example, we are informed that the bill would require the Xev York Credit
Men's Association [New York Credit and Financial Management Association] to recover
its costs of operation from its member-creditors rather than from the estate of the debtor
being rehabilitated." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 344
(March 5, 1956).
15. A recent article states that these organizations will not accept comprnsation from the
debtor, but will request payment from the creditor who will be advised of this added
expense before any settlement. The article concludes, "... . that this is a sounder, more
realistic and more efficient manner of handling these cases." 49 Credit Executive No. 5,
p. 8, May 1956. To clarify the present situation concerning debt adjustment activities in
New York, two facts should be noted. First, the only debt adjustment companies that now
exist are those in which the creditors are organized so that the adjustment company can be
assured of payment for its services from these creditors. Second, an independent debt adjust-
ment company obviously cannot function as it will incur expen-es in aiding the debtor with-
out any guarantee of payment for services from his creditors.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. In addition to the above stated, other jurisdictions have combatted this problem in
various ways. In Ohio, there has been no need for a budget planning prohibition, as sucb,
since a state statute allows a debtor to apply to the municipal court for the appointment of
a trustee who will perform much the same services as would a budget planner. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2329.70 (1953). Pennsylvania enacted a statute covering budget planning which
is very similar to that of New York. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1S, 4S97 (1955). California has
not as yet passed any legislation controlling budget planning. However, many of its news,-
papers recognizing that unethical practices are prevalent have adopted stringent rules in rea-
tion to the acceptance of advertising from such enterprises. Better Businecs Bureau of Los
Angeles, "9Debt-Adjustors" Copy to be Cleared by BBB, 3 Report No. 22, Dec. 28, 1955.
18. Mle. Re,. Stat. c. 137, §§ 51-53 (Supp. 1955).
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Massachusetts has made the furnishing of advice in regard to budget planning
a practice of law,19 and, therefore, has confined it solely to members of the bar.20
In Wisconsin a different approach was taken since it placed debt adjustment
companies under regulatory statutes, compliance with which was necessary
before they could legally transact business.21 The State Commissioner of Banks
was given supervisory powers, while statutory requirements were prescribed
relating to licenses, applications, fees and bonds. Stringent regulations were
thereby placed upon any who wished to engage in this business, and members
of the bar as well were made subject to these regulations.
As noted previously, some jurisdictions have limited debt adjustment endeavors
by determining that they constitute the practice of law. New York has not as yet
gone that far, though at the last session of the legislature a bill to that effect was
introduced and subsequently withdrawn.2 2 Those arguing that budget planning
constitutes the practice of law rely principally on the fact that these agencies
have to distinguish between types of creditors: general, preferred, or secured,
and in so doing encroach upon activities which are within the sole purview of the
legal profession. The opposing position is that such defining and categorizing
of creditors merely is a form of financial advice. Additional arguments were
advanced to show this was a practice of law, noting that the debtor would be
advised as to the remedies of his creditors and as to alternative forms of relief
under the Bankruptcy Act.
It must be noted in any discussion of wage-earner debt plans that Congress
has considered the same on the national level by the enactment of chapter XIII
of the Bankruptcy Act.23 Chapter XIII provides an aid to wage-earners with
an income of $5,000 or less in the adjustment and liquidation of their debts. 4
Under this procedure, a wage-earner debtor may petition a federal district court
for the formulation of a plan whereby the debtor pays so much to a court-ap-
pointed trustee who in turn distributes these amounts to the creditors. 2 The
19. New York attempted to attain the same solution. See note 22 infra.
20. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 221, §§ 46, 46C (1955). It might also be noted that the Province
of Quebec amended its Bar Provision Act by classifying budget planning activities as an
unauthorized practice of Law. Borrowers are Being Played for Suckers by So-called "Debt-
Adjustors" or "Pro-Raters," CXX American Banker No. 39, Feb. 28, 1955.
21. Wis. Stat. § 218.02 (1955).
22. "The furnishing of advice or services for compensation to a debtor in connection
with a debt pooling plan, pursuant to which the debtor deposits funds for the purpose of
distributing' them among his creditors, shall constitute the practice of law. Any person who,
not being admitted to practice as an attorney-at-law in this state, furnishes or offers to
furnish such advice or services shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." S. Bill Int. 54 179th N.Y.
Legis. Sess. (1956). The probable reason that this bill was not passed was the legislature's
realization that the legitimate debt adjustment activities such as those carried on by the
New York Credit and Financial Management Association would necessarily cease.
23. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-86 (1946).
24. An amendment increased the income limit from $3,6C0 to $5,000, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1006
(Supp. 1955).
25. This plan goes into effect only if a majority of creditors agree, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1052
(1946). Secured creditors may agree to accept this plan or they may look to their security,




debtor has three years to pay, during which period he is safe from legal actions
of all creditors who are under the plan. Upon the expiration of this three-year
period, if the court finds justification for so doing, it may discharge the debtor
as to unpaid balances owed.2
Representatives of the legitimate debt-adjusting houses throughout the
country, in order to justify their existence in the face of such a federal statute,
contend that chapter XIII plans are disadvantageous to creditor and debtor
alike. They point out that under a wage-earner plan a creditor does not retain
control over his debt and that the expense to the debtor is greater than the
legitimate debt adjustor's services which are substantially similar.2 7 There
is some support for this argument,7 though a recent authority argues that a
chapter XIII proceeding is relatively inexpensive and is being resorted to more
frequently today.-9
The New York legislature was confronted with a business practice character-
ized by dishonest, and corruption. A radical step was taken by its passage of the
budget planning statute in that it completely prohibited the business community
from again entering this field. It may be argued that the abuses justified this
action, but in the light of all the circumstances this appears doubtful. The legis-
lature, in drafting the present bill, was dealing with an enterprise which was
totally unrestricted prior to 1956. Such prior legislative acquiescence might well
have been held a contributing factor to the unethical practices then prevalent,
and one which should have been considered when attempting to find a proper
remedy for this problem. The exclusion of that segment of the business populace
which might now, or in the future, desire legitimately to earn a livelihood in this
field has a far-reaching effect, and is an act which should not have been resorted
to until every affirmative regulatory measure had been exhausted. Certainly a
positive plan, such as that applied in Wisconsin,co would have been more in keep-
ing with the prevailing tenor of aiding business enterprise within this leading
commercial state.
The foregoing argument would, of course, be unfounded if the legislature had
taken either of two steps. First, had they agreed that debt adjustment activities
did not afford a public service, in which case regulatory measures would obviously
be to no purpose. This, impliedly, they did not do since members of the bar are
specifically authorized to continue in this field.3l Secondly, had the legislature
said in explicit terms that these activities were a practice of law, then budget
planning would have been deemed to fall solely within the realm of the legal pro-
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (1946).
27. There are administrative charges, plus the expenses of an attorney, referee, and trustee.
See 11 U.S.CA. §§ 1024, 1026, 1059 (1946). Further, the approval of this plan amounts to
a discharge in bankruptcy and another discharge would not be available to the debtor for a
six-year period. 11 U.S.CA. § 32 (1953).
28. Note, Wage-Earner Plans in Chicago, S Chi. L. Rev. 105 (1940).
29. Hefter, The Lucky XIII, Legal Aid Brief Case, Feb. 1955.
30. See note 21 supra. A prime consideration and possible deterrent to the initiation of
such a plan is the allocation of state funds to support it.
31. See note 5 supra.
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fession and again there would have been no need for affirmative measures. This,
too, they failed to do. 32
Therefore, while the legislature has admitted that such budget planning
services are useful and that they do not constitute a practice of law, it has not
attempted to eliminate the unethical few by affirmative regulations which would
have afforded the honest business populace their opportunities in this field. 3
Instead, it has prohibited all extra-legal participation. It is submitted that the
better solution to this problem, and those of this nature, lies in supervisory and
statutory regulations, not in exclusionary measures.
DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS EXTENDED
Chapter 270 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 amends section 205 of the
Surrogate's Court Act so as to include "money deposited" in the definition
of the term "money or other personal property" as relates to the jurisdiction
of the Surrogate's Court over proceedings to discover property withheld. A
similar measure, chapter 222 of the Session Laws of 1956 amends the Civil
Practice Act by adding thereto section 1377-b, which makes available to the
committee of an incompetent discovery proceedings heretofore restricted to
the personal representative of a decedent.
The discovery proceeding employed by the personal representative of a decedent
and now also at the disposal of the committee of an incompetent is a statutory pro-
ceeding as distinguished from the more common "Bill of Discovery" found in
equity. Statutory discovery is a method for gaining control of the assets of an
estate which are in the hands of a third party, or of acquiring information concern-
ing the status of personal property which the representative has reason to believe
properly belongs to the estate.' It is a special proceeding2 , in rem in naturea,
and summary in form.4 Although similar in many respects to the action of
replevin, it permits of much greater latitude, being considered essentially inquisi-
torial.5 However, a representative may not employ this proceeding merely to
adduce evidence to be used in another action.6
32. See note 22 supra.
33. The article cited in note 4 supra attests to the fact that there are some legitimate
operators in this field. See also the report of the American Association of Creditor Coun-
sellors at a meeting of the Retail Credit Association held in Des Moines, Iowa, Sept. 13,
1955. But see a recent article which stated, "It is interesting to note that the bill [Budget
Planning] . . . places the task of helping the unfortunate debtor in the hands of those who
can perhaps effectively accomplish results for the debtor,-the lawyers." 20 Albany L. Rev.
267, 269 (1956).
1. 12 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice 74 (1954); 4 Jessup-Redfield,
Surrogates' Law and Practice §§ 3049-51 (rev. ed. 1949).
2. In re Spreen's Estate, 1 Civ. Proc. Rep. (N.Y.) 375 (Surr. Ct. 1881).
3. In re Hossan's Estate, 162 Misc. 333, 294 N.Y. Supp. 516 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
4. In re Stewart's Estate, 77 Hun 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1894).
5. Matter of Heinze, 224 N.Y. 1, 120 N.E. 63 (1918); In re Hawkin's Estate, 37 N.Y.S.
2d 338 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
6. In re Katz' Estate, 63 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Surr. Ct. 1946) ; In re Lowe's Estate, 148 Misc.
107, 265 N.Y. Supp. 420 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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The amendment to section 205 of the Surrogate's Court Act seeks to resolve
the confusion that has existed as to the jurisdiction of that court to issue
an order to a bank for the delivery to the decedent's personal representative
of a bank deposit in the name of the decedent.7 This enactment was recom-
mended by the Surrogate's Association of the State of New York as a direct
result of the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Mattcr of Trevor.3
In that case the court ruled that the Surrogate had no jurisdiction to order
a bank to deliver the proceeds of an ordinary bank account to the representative
of a decedent's estate. The new amendment defines the term "money or other
personal property" to include "money deposited and all property rights of the
depositor consequent upon the deposit of money",0 thereby allowing the dis-
covery proceeding to reach such deposits.
The jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court is entirely statutory.'( The general
powers and jurisdiction of the Surrogate are set out in section 40 of the Surro-
gate's Court Act, while sections 205 and 206 particularize on the court's juris-
diction in regard to proceedings to discover withheld property."' Prior to 1923
it was held that a third person proceeded against could defeat such a proceeding
by filing a verified answer setting up as affirmative defenses ownership or
the right to possession of the property withheld.'- In Matter of Hyams,'0
it was decided that the Surrogate's Court had jurisdiction to determine the right
to possession of specific money or personal property which belonged to the de-
ceased in his lifetime. The court was still denied authority to follow the pro-
ceeds of property wrongfully sold or disposed of.' 4 The year after the Hyams
case was decided section 206 was amended to permit the court to follow and
7. For cases holding there is jurisdiction see Matter of Akin, 248 N.Y. 202, 161 N.E. 471
(192S) ; In re Hirsch's Estate, 202 Mfsc. 561, 116 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re
Bloch's Estate, 48 N.Y..2d 823 (Surf. Ct. 1944); Matter of Jacobsen, 178 Me. 479, 35
N.Y..2d 40 (Surr. Ct. 1942). For decisions denying such jurisdiction see Matter of Trevor,
309 N.Y. 389, 131 N.E.24 561 (1955); Matter of Brazil, 219 App. Div. 594, 220 N.Y. Supp.
331 (1st Dep't 1927); Matter of White, 119 App. Div. 140, 103 N.Y.Supp. 6 (2d Dep't
1907).
8. 309 N.Y. 389, 131 N.E.2d 561 (1955).
9. The complete change reads: "The term 'money or other personal property', as used
in this section, shall include money deposited and all property rights of the depositor con-
sequent upon the deposit of money by the decedent or to his credit or for his account with
a bank, trust company, savings bank, savings and loan association, private banker or other
person in respect of which the depositary claims no beneficial interest other than his or its
proper costs, fees or expenses.'
10. Matter of Runk, 200 N.Y. 447, 94 N.E. 363 (1911); see also Matter of Work, 76
Misc. 403, 137 N.Y. Supp. 97 (Surf. Ct. 1912), aff'd 151 App. Div. 707, 136 N.Y. Supp.
218 (1st Dep't 1912).
11. These sections were initially based on chapter 394 of the Laws of 1870 and were
restricted to New York County. Subsequently sections 2707 and 2710 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extended the provisions of this chapter to apply statewide.
12. Matter of Walker, 136 N.Y. 20, 32 N.E. 633 (1892); Matter of Scott, 34 Misc. 446,
70 N.Y. Supp. 425 (Surr. Ct. 1901).
13. 237 N.Y. 211, 142 N.E. 589 (1923).
14. Id. at 217, 142 N.E. at 590.
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issue an order to recover or to direct payment of the proceeds or value of such
property.15
More recent pronouncements upon the scope of jurisdiction have held that
generally the Surrogate has jurisdiction over all matters, legal and equitable,
which are necessary to settle the question before the court.,' While the Surro-
gate's Court has jurisdiction to dispose of every claim for or against a decedent's
estate,17 it has no power to compel the payment of common debts or the enforce-
ment of contract obligations.'8 "The Surrogate's Court is not a court of general
jurisdiction."' 9 It can exercise its power only under some statutory provision
and in one of the particular cases authorized by the legislature. The courts have
held that the legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the Surrogate to entertain
discovery proceedings pertaining to the following subject matters: shares of
stock,20 proceeds of an insurance policy,2 ' documents relating to the financial
affairs of decedents, 22 death benefits from a labor organization, 23 an interest of the
decedent in a mortgage,24 a deposit of foreign money, 25 secret commissions, 20
money of a client held in trust by an attorney,27 the proceeds of sale of personal
property, 28 and securities or money commingled with trust funds.29
It has been consistently held, however, by the New York appellate courts that
the Surrogate's Court has no jurisdiction to direct a person, not entitled to share
in the distribution of a decedent's estate, to pay a contractual obligation to the
estate.30 Likewise it has been held that the Surrogate has no jurisdiction
to order a bank to deliver the proceeds of an account when the relationship
between the bank and the deceased is deemed to be merely that of debtor and
15. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1924, c. 100.
16. McLean v. Hart, 228 App. Div. 379, 239 N.Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't 1930), aff'd 262 N.Y.
552, 188 N.E. 60 (1933).
17. Matter of Grossman, 233 App. Div. 887, 251 N.Y. Supp. 670 (4th Dep't 1931).
18. Matter of Hammer, 237 App. Div. 497, 261 N.Y. Supp. 47B (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd,
261 N.Y. 677, 185 N.E. 789 (1933) ; Matter of Forrest, 234 App. Div. 890, 254 N.Y. Supp.
1012 (2d Dep't 1931), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 553, 182 N.E. 177 (1932); Matter of Thoms, 165 Misc.
398, 300 N.Y. Supp. 872 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
19. In re Wilson's Will, 284 App. Div. 1018, 134 N.Y.S.2d 818 (4th Dep't 1954).
20. Matter of Babcock, 85 Misc. 256, 147 N.Y. Supp. 168 (Surr. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 169
App. Div. 903, 153 N.Y. Supp. 1105 (3d Dep't 1915), aff'd, 216 N.Y. 717, 111 N.E.
1084 (1915).
21. Matter of Howley, 133 Misc. 34, 231 N.Y. Supp. 95 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
22. Matter of Ryan, 115 Misc. 472, 188 N.Y. Supp. 387 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
23. Matter of Reilly, 111 Misc. 66, 182 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
24. Matter of Hauber, 136 Misc. 798, 244 N.Y. Supp. 343 (Surr. Ct. 1930).
25. Matter of Gruen, 1 Misc. 2d 41, So N.Y.S.2d 890 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
26. Matter of Browning, 177 Misc. 328, 30 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
27. Matter of Ostrow, 162 Misc. 783, 295 N.Y. Supp. 610 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
28. Matter of Fraley, 129 Misc. 803, 221 N.Y. Supp. 461 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
29. Matter of Rubin, 168 Misc. 81, 5 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
30. Matter of Schaefer, 294 N.Y. 24, 60 N.E.2d 193 (1945) ; In re Hitchings' Estate,
281 App. Div. 202, 119 N.Y.S.2d 138 (4th Dep't 1953) ; In re Jastrzewski's Estate, 252
App. Div. 384, 300 N.Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't 1937).
creditor.31 The object of the proceeding authorized by section 205 is "specific
property or the value or proceeds thereof," and not merely a general claim
against a party purely in personam.32 While recognizing the limitation on the
Surrogate's Court as to the adjudication of common debts, some lower court
decisions have tried to consider an uncontested bank account sui generis.3
In Matter of Trevor,3 4 a decedent's administrator brought discovery pro-
ceedings to recover the balance of two bank accounts opened by the decedent
under fictitious names. The bank did not deny the existence of the accounts
nor claim any beneficial interest therein. It merely sought the protection of a
court order before paying the money. The Court of Appeals held: " . . . the
Surrogate's Court does not have jurisdiction to direct payment of the balance
in a decedent's bank account to his estate representative."3 In explaining its
position the court said: "The debt from the trust company here to its deposi-
tors . . . is not different in essence from any other debt arising on a contract.
The chose in action possessed by the estate of decedent is not property withheld
by the trust company. Nor can it be said that the trust company holds proceeds
or value arising from diversion or other disposition of property which belonged
to the decedent." 36 It reasoned that: "The 1939 amendments to sections 205
and 206 did not add to the power of the Surrogate with respect to directing
payment of a bank deposit. According to the Bill Notes to chapter 343 of the
Laws of 1939, the amendments had a two-fold purpose: (1) authorizing a testa-
mentary trustee to bring discovery proceedings, and (2) permitting the bring-
ing in of a third party claiming the right to possession of the property."3
This decision seemed to rule out the use of discovery proceedings to recover
the proceeds of a bank account when no claim of beneficial interest is made
by the bank. In effect, it would appear to place an unnecessary burden on the
executor or administrator in the fulfillment of his duty to marshal the assets
of an estate by forcing him to resort to plenary proceedings. Prior to the Trevor
decision, section 205 had been utilized in proceedings against banks to recover
the amount of a decedent's account. Not infrequently, the bank did not inter-
pose the defense of lack of jurisdiction since it did not desire to retain the money
but merely to have the protection of a court order identifying the rightful
owner of the deposit. 38 In light of the clear language of the court in the Trevor
case, it seems probable that the banks would have been less likely to run the
risk of having such an order, upon which they depended for protection against
subsequent claims, declared void for lack of jurisdiction. "The trust company
31. Matter of Trevor, 309 N.Y. 3S9, 131 N.E.2d 561 (1955); Matter of Hammer, 237
App. Div. 497, 261 N.Y. Supp. 478 (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 677, 1SS N.E. 789
(1933); Matter of Brazil, 219 App. Div. 594, 220 N.Y. Supp. 331 (Ist Dep't 1927); Matter
of White, 119 App. Div. 140, 103 N.Y. Supp. 86S (2d Dcp't 1907).
32. Matter of Lusher, 159 Misc. 387, 237 N.Y. Supp. 1000 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
33. Matter of Jacobsen, 178 Misc. 479, 35 N.YS.2d 40 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
34. 309 N.Y. 389, 131 N.E.2d 561 (1955).
35. Id. at 394, 131 N.E.2d at 563.
36. Id. at 393, 131 N.E.2d at 563.
37. Id. at 394, 131 N.E.2d at 564.
38. 3 Warren's Heaton, Surrogates' Courts 235 (6th ed. 1941).
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may not be asked to content itself with the Surrogate's decree or be told that
the Surrogate's decree will protect it against a possible later claim as much as
a judgment in an action, for the decree of a court lacking jurisdiction of the
subject matter is a nullity which affords no protection since it can be overturned
at any time." 39 Voluntary submission to jurisdiction by the bank would not be
sufficient to remedy the deficiency and could add nothing to the decree. "And
although jurisdiction of the person may be conferred by consent, the parties
may not consent to confer upon the court jurisdiction over the subject matter."40
The legislature, in the form of the new amendment, has offered a simple and effec-
tive solution to a problem which has not only worked inequities on the parties
concerned but has also added a cumbersome burden to the judicial process.
As Judge Cardozo wrote: "To remit the claimant to another forum after all these
advances and retreats . . . would be a postponement of justice equivalent to a
denial. If anything is due him, he should get it in the forum whose aid he has
envoked." 41
In an effort to make available to the committee of an incompetent summary
proceedings to discover withheld property such as are available to executors,
administrators, testamentary trustees, and guardians under sections 205 and
206 of the Surrogate's Court Act, the legislature in the present session amended
the Civil Practice Act by adding section 1377-b. The new section is similar to
and closely parallels sections 205 and 206 of the Surrogate's Court Act as they
read prior to the amendment effected by chapter 270 of the 1956 Session Laws.
The discovery proceeding established by section 1377-b provides that a com-
mittee may petition the court appointing him for an inquiry. He must show in
his petition that personal property to which he is entitled is being withheld from
him, or that knowledge concerning said property is being withheld. As with
section 205, he may set forth the facts on information and belief. The court
may make appropriate decrees directing delivery of the property to the com-
mittee.42
The section does not make provision for the summary disposition of all claims
to property withheld nor does it deny to either party the right to demand a trial
by jury. The interposition, however, of a verified answer in writing, stating any
claim of title to, or right to possession of, any subject matter is permitted. The
section further states, "If any such answer be interposed, the issues raised
thereby shall be tried according to the usual practice of the court as a litigated
issue." 43 Due to the broad language of this provision it is probable that any
constitutional question as to the denial of the right to trial by jury is forestalled.44
With the present state of court calendars it seems only logical to extend the
scope of discovery and other summary proceedings commensurate with the de-
mands of justice. The instant legislation is in keeping with the recommendation
39. 309 N.Y. at 394, 131 N.E.2d at 563.
40. In re Ripley's Will, Misc. , 148 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
41. Raymond v. Davis, 248 N.Y. 67, 72, 161 N.E. 421, 423 (1928).
42. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 49 (Feb. 6, 1956).
43. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 222.
44. See note 42 supra.
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of the Temporary Commission on the Courts, that the expanded use of discovery
proceedings be effected. 5 Both new sections will exspedite the handling of
matters pertaining to incompetents and to decedent's estates and contribute
in some measure to the reduction of the great volume of litigated matters before
the courts.
JOINDER OF ISSUE BY STIPULATION
WHERE FACTS ARE DISPUTED
Chapter 219 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 amends the Civil
Practice Act by adding a new section, 218-a, providing for a simplified alter-
native procedure for commencement of an action by eliminating the necessity for
the service of a summons and pleadings and permitting joinder of issue by the
filing of a stipulated statement of claims and defenses, together with a note
of issue.'
The first New York civil practice code was enacted in 184S and 1849. To
keep pace with the rapid development of the state and consequently of its law,
the Code of Procedure was constantly in the process of piecemeal amendment.
Its resultant complexity demanded and brought about, after almost thirty-two
years, a complete revision in 1876. The revised code, known as the Code of Civil
Procedure, underwent, for similar reasons, the same process of amendment with
the same resulting complexity and demand for revision.
In 1920 the last revision, the current Civil Practice Act, was enacted. The
familiar pattern of state industrial and economic growth was paralleled by that
of the law. In 1934 the Judicial Council was created to assist the legislature in
dealing with the problem thus created and that body's efforts have resulted
in many improvements. 2 Nevertheless, the process of gradual amendment has
45. Temporary Comm. on the Courts, 1956 Report at 146.
1. The complete text of the new section is as follows: "Section 21S-a. Action without
summons or pleadings. Any other statute or rule to the contrary notwithstanding, a civil
action may be commenced without the service of a summons, or may be continued after
the service of a summons, without pleadings, by the filing of a statement, signed and
acknowledged by all the parties to the action, specifying the lims and defenses between
the parties and the relief requested. Such a filing, together with a note of isue, to be fled
at the same time, All constitute the joinder of issues in the action. Rules may be made
regulating the requisites and form of such statement." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 213-a. Two
of the aforementioned rules of procedure were announced on November 3, 1956 by the
Appellate Division to be effective immediately throughout New York State. They provide:
1. A requirement for a certificate that both sides have completed all necczzary pre-trial
proceedings-such as furnishing bills of particulars, completing Lxaminations before tria
and locating witnesses-before the cases can go on a court calendar.
2. A permission for the parties to submit a joint simple statement of their controversy-
avoiding the complication of opposing complaints and replies--and then to get an appoint-
ment with the court to arrange an early trial date. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1956, p, 33, col. 1.
2. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1934, c. 128. This body was supplanted by the Judicial Con-
ference of the State of New York, created by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 869. It is corn-
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again rendered New York's civil procedure so complex as to be an unreasonable
burden upon the bench, the bar and the public. In addition to the needless
consumption of time and money, the fact is that today some cases are still being
decided upon the basis of procedure rather than substantive merit.a
Unlike cases in tort awaiting trial by jury, the courts are up to date in han-
dling commercial litigation. Thus, once the issue in a commercial action has been
joined, it may be resolved with dispatch. From the point of view of the citizen
however, the period between the time he takes his problem to his lawyer and
the time that it is resolved is far too often viewed as anything but "dispatch".
The source of the trouble has been the time consuming process of pleading,
considered by some to be necessary in arriving at a joinder of issues in many
complex types of actions,4 but which frequently is not essential in simple com-
mercial conflicts. The present method whereby litigants reach a joinder of issue
may entail, in addition to a complaint and answer, a reply, a bill of particulars
and a number of motions directed to the pleadings.5 The possibility of an
posed of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the four presiding justices of the Appellate
Divisions of the Supreme Court and one justice of the Supreme Court from each judicial
department not assigned to the Appellate Division thereof.
3. Temporary Commission on the Courts of the State of New York, Annual Report 21
(1955).
4. The necessity of formal pleading to arrive at a joinder of issues is disputed. Opponents
of the formal procedure cite the comparative ease with which issues are joined under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly under the general provisions laid down
in Rule 8, the provisions for depositions pending action in rule 26 and the discovery pro-
cedure governed by rule 34.
5. More fully stated, to commence a lawsuit prior to the present amendment, it was
necessary to serve a summons upon the defendant, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 218. The drawing
of the issues between the parties was, and still may be, accomplished by pleading. The first
pleading is the complaint, stating the claims of the plaintiff, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 254.
If the complaint is not served at the time of the summons, the defendant may at any time
within twenty days serve a demand for it which must be answered within twenty days
thereafter. If the demand is not so answered the defendant may apply to the court for
dismissal. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 257. Defendant's defenses and possible counterclaims form
his answer, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 260, which must be served upon the plaintiff within twenty
days after receipt of the complaint, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 263. If the defendant asserts a
counterclaim, the plaintiff may set up a defense of his own or reply, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 272, which he must serve upon the defendant within twenty days, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §
273. In addition, motions directed to the pleadings may be made. Under N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 244, a party may amend his pleading once without application to the court provided
he acts within the time specified in the statute. If a party fails to exercise his right under
section 244 to "amend of course," then leave to amend must be obtained from the court
by moving under N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 105.
A party may move to compel his adversary to serve an amended pleading to separately
number and state causes, N.Y. Rule Civ. Prac. 90; to make the pleadings more definite and
certain, N.Y. Rule Civ. Prac. 102 (1) ; to correct a defect of parties, N.Y. Rule Civ. Prac.
102 (2) or to strike out improper matter, N.Y. Rule Civ. Prac. 103. A party faced with
a complaint or a counterclaim may demand a bill of particulars as to the allegations con-
tained therein, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 247. After issue shall have been first joined, or subsequent
to forty days after service of a summons initiating the action shall have been completed,
[Vol. 25
opponent's use of dilatory, but statutory, procedures is frequently enough
to dissuade a citizen from making use of his courts and thereby to force upon
him an inequitable compromise of his just claims.
The present amendment dispenses with the necessity of a summons and
complaint. The parties have merely to submit their claims and defenses in a
single statement which, when signed and acknowledged by all the parties to the
action and filed with a note of issue constitutes a joinder of issue. No other
pleadings or motions directed to the pleadings are permitted. The Judicial Con-
ference in announcing its recommendation of the alternative procedure, stated
that "to further expedite trials all courts would undertake to hear commercial
cases submitted under the simplified procedure by appointment with the
parties."7
The idea of commencing an action without summons or pleadings is not new.
Submission of a controversy upon agreed facts is provided for in section 546
through section 548 of the Civil Practice Act and may be traced from them
through the Code of Civil Procedure of 18768 back to the Code of Procedure
of 1849.9 The use of this method of joinder has always been restricted to cases
where there is no dispute as to the facts but only as to the law, a restriction
which has been strictly construed by the courts in dealing with cases submitted
under the aforementioned sections.' 0 In spite of this, these sections have been
frequently resorted to, which fact may well have prompted their extension
to comparable cases involving disputed facts.
The provisions of the new section also invite comparison to the process of
arbitration. Both procedures provide for speedy commencement and a prompt
hearing, facets which are popular with businessmen for whom time is money.
There is however, one feature of arbitration, considered undesirable by many,
which is not found in section 218-a, the fact that the decision of an arbiter is
final and binding upon all the parties. Under the procedure of the new section,
however, both parties retain the protection of the right to an appellate review.
Furthermore, the proceedings are conducted under the rules of evidence and the
irrespective of joinder of issue, any party may place a cause upon the court calendar for trial
by filing a note of issue and serving copies thereof. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 433. A note of
issue consists of a simple written statement informing the court wherein the case is to be tried
that the issues have been joined. The statement is subscribed by one of the attorneys, usually
that of the plaintiff, and filed by him with the clerk of the courL
6. See note 5 supra.
7. judicial Conference of the State of New York, Press Release, Feb. 27, 1956.
S. N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1279.
9. N.Y. Code Proc. § 372.
10. N.Y. Civ Prac. Act §§ 546, 547, 548. In Cohen v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co.,
297 N.Y. 266, 78 N.E. 2d 604 (194S) the court held that under section 546 of the Civil
Practice Act, the effect of agreed facts, as a matter of law, is the only question to be con-
sidered: the court has no power to find any additional fact. The Appellate Division held
in Matter of Gorman's Restaurant v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 166, 8 N.Y.S2d 230 (1st
Dep't 1949), that under section 546 the court may not find any facts by inference in
addition to those stipulated. Where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the stipulated
facts, dismissal of the submission without prejudice was required. See Graham v. East
88th Street Corp., 282 App. Div. 754, 122 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1st Dep't 1953).
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parties may elect either a trial by jury or the court. As a result of this com-
bination of the advantages of both the court and arbitration systems, it is quite
possible that we shall see the inclusion in an increasing number of commercial
contracts, of clauses calling for the resolution of conflicts by the courts under
the simplified procedures described rather than by arbitration.
It is, however, most important to remember that this legislation, no matter
how apt, is still but another of the multitude of constant piecemeal amendments
to the Civil Practice Act that in the aggregate have rendered the Act itself
grossly unwieldy. The problem of procedural delays and congested calendars
may well be resolved only by an over-all study and a complete revision of civil
procedure.
RECONVEYANCE BY NEW YORK CITY OF
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY IN REM PROCEEDING
Chapter 481 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 adds a new section to the
Administrative Code of the City of New York, providing that under certain
circumstances the City may reconvey to former owners, or others having a valid
interest therein, real property which the City acquired by virtue of an in rem
foreclosure of a tax lien.1
The section provides that the Board of Estimate may, in its discretion, 2
reconvey the City's interest acquired in such an action to any person, association,
or corporation which had title thereto at the time the list of delinquent taxes
was filed in the foreclosure action. Property which the City has already assigned
to municipal agencies is excepted from the operation of the statute.
An application for such a grant, conveyance, or release must be in writing
and verified.3 It must be made within four months after the date of acquisition
in cases where the property was acquired subsequent to the date on which the
section became effective and within two months after the date of acquisition in
cases where the property was acquired prior to that date.4
The Board of Estimate is also authorized to consider timely applications from
persons who had a lien of record on such property, or who had entered into a
written agreement to insure such property prior to the commencement of the
1. Administrative Code of the City of New York, § D17-25.0.
2. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis., at 284 (Feb. 27, 1936):
"The proposed law while permissive in form probably will be treated as mandatory by the
Board of Estimate. In the case of section D41-43.0 of the Administrative Code, under which
tax exempt owners are given similar relief, the Board has honored all proper applications".
3. Administrative Code of the City of New York, § D17-25.0. The application must
contain: (1) the identity of the applicant and the interest which he has in the property
in question, (2) a statement that the applicant is acting solely in his own interest and has
not accepted or agreed to accept any consideration for making the application in return for
a promise to transfer, assign or convey the property subsequently to be conveyed to him
by the City, (3) proof that the applicant had the interest claimed on the date of the filing
of the list of delinquent taxes.
4. This section became effective on April 9, 1956.
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foreclosure proceeding. The application of the owner, however, if made within
the specified time, will be given priority.
It is specifically provided that the title which the City is empowered to grant
under the terms of this act is the title which was vested in the owner at the
time the list of deliquent taxes was filed. In this way the equities of all parties
having liens on the property as of that time would be protected despite the
subsequent foreclosure sale and release.
The conveyance or release is conditioned upon payment of all the charges
due together with interest and the foreclosure costs, the latter not to exceed
$505. While all repair, maintenance, and operational costs must also be paid,
credit is allowed for income received.
Prescinding from section D17-25.0 the Code provides that if a tax lien
has been outstanding for a period of four or more years from the date upon
which it arose, such lien may be summarily foreclosed.3 The filing of the list
of delinquent taxes with the county clerk begins the action of foreclosure and
has the same force and effect as the filing and recording of a lis pendens.0 Notice
is required to be given by publication in two newspapers for six consecutive
weeks and by either mailing of notice to the taxpayer if his name and address
are known by the City Treasurer's office or by conspicuous posting if his name
and address are not known.7 Any person having an interest or claim in such
property may redeem the same within seven weeks after the date of first pub-
lication or may file an answer at any time after the date of first publication
but within twenty days after the last day for redemption.8
Provision for in rem tax foreclosure was introduced into the Administrative Code
in order to avoid the expensive and time consuming method of foreclosure in
personam.Y The constitutionality of the in rem foreclosure, particularly with
reference to the sufficiency of the notice permitted, was upheld in City of N w
York v. Feit.10
5. Administrative Code of the City of New York, § D17-4.0.
6. Id. § D17-5.0.
7. Id. § D17-6.0.
S. Id. § D17-6.0.
9. City of New York v. Ernst, 202 Iisc. 911, 103 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
10. 200 lisc. 99S, 110 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Prior to this decision, the Appellate
Division, ruling on an almost identical provision in Art. 7-A tit. 3 of the New York Tax Law,
declared the notice there required sufficient to satisfy due process. City of Nei- York v.
Echo Bay Waterfront Corp., 26S App. Div. 182, 49 N.Y.S.2d 673 (2d Dep't 1944), afd
without opinion, 294 N.Y. 678, 60 N.E.2d 83S (1945). In its Echo Bay decision the
Appellate Division referred to earlier analogous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and the courts of New York State. See North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 263
.U.S. 276 (1925) ; Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1903) ; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 US. 241
(1907); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904); Winos & St. Peter Land Co. v. MIinneota,
159 U.S. 526 (1395); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U.S. 559 (1SS9); Utica . Proite, 173
Misc. 925, 30 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 283 N.A. 477, 41 N.E2d 174 (1942);
Buffalo v. Hawks, 226 App. Div. 4S0, 236 N.Y. Supp. 89 (4th Dep't 1929), alid without
opinion, 251 N.Y. 58S, 163 NE. 438 (1929). But see Lynbrook Gardens, Irc. v. Ullmann,
291 N.Y. 472, 53 N.E.2d 353 (1943). There the lower court had held that a judgment of
foreclosure, rendered without personal service of process in an in rem proceeding against
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Inequities were soon found, however, in the application of the statute. Con-
structive notice is not equivalent to actual notice and many an owner found
his property taken without his knowledge. While it is true that owners of
property are " . . . bound to keep themselves informed as to what was trans-
piring with reference to their property,"'" there were instances where the
owner's failure to keep himself informed was at least excusable. Town of Somers
v. Covey 12 is illustrative. There the taxpayer was feeble-minded and for many
years had been unable to handle her own affairs. Town officials with knowledge
of her condition commenced foreclosure. Immediately after foreclosure the tax-
payer was adjudicated incompetent. Her committee offered to redeem but the
town refused to accept the offered payments. The committee's action to open
the default resulted in a holding that the court was without power to grant
relief, and that the rights of the parties became fixed and unalterable upon the
expiration of the time for redemption and answer.
In Hawley v. City of New York, 13 the City Treasurer, not having the name
and address of the taxpayer, used the alternate method of notice, i.e., con-
spicuous posting in a public place. Immediately after the foreclosure the plain-
tiff offered to pay the arrears. At the trial it was pointed out that the name and
address of the taxpayer were on file in the City tax department. In light of this
fact the plaintiff contended that the City was required to mail him notice
of the foreclosure proceeding. It was held that the court did not have the power
to open a default in such a case even though plaintiff's name and address were
on file in the tax department, knowledge by the tax department being held not
to be equivalent to knowledge by the City Treasurer.
In City of New York v. Nelson1 4 relief had been denied a plaintiff whose
property, assessed for $52,000, the City had acquired for the failure of the
plaintiff's bookkeeper to pay taxes amounting to $887. The Court of Appeals,
in affirming, held that it was without the power to open the default or to provide
any other relief. The court recognized the hardship inflicted upon the plaintiff
but reiterated its inability to remedy the situation in the absence of legislative
enactment.
Insofar as it provides relief from such inequities, the new law is commend-
able, but it is to be remembered that the ultimate purpose of in rem foreclosure
property upon which taxes were in default, did not deprive delinquent taxpayers of their
property without due process. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that, in light of the
fact that the action was brought to enforce specific performance in a contract for sale
of the foreclosed property, the ultimate question was not whether the foreclosure was con-
stitutional but whether the title was marketable. The court said that the latter question
would depend upon whether the foreclosure was constitutional under the Federal Con-
stitution and that, since they could not decide this, there was still a possibility that the fore-
closure was unconstitutional. Therefore, there was a possibility that the title was not good
and so it was not marketable.
11. City of New York v. Lynch, 281 App. Div. 1038, 121 N.Y.S.2d 392 (2d Dep't
1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 809, 118 N.E.2d 821 (1954).
12. 283 App. Div. 883, 129 N.Y.S.2d 537 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 798, 125
N.E.2d 862 (1955).
13. 283 App. Div. 882, 131 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1954).
14. 309 N.Y. 94, 127 N.E.2d 827 (1955).
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proceedings is to enforce the payment of taxes. Insofar as it fails that purpose
the method of foreclosure provided by the Administrative Code, even with the
addition of the new section, is open to criticism. Granting that the new section
does secure the collection of taxes which were not collected before, i.e., the taxes
of those who were willing to redeem their property by paying their arrears,
nevertheless, a rather indirect and budensome method of compelling tax pay-
ments is provided. It would certainly be more desirable to collect taxes without
the aid of a foreclosure proceeding. To this effect a provision for either actual
notice or at least notice that would more probably reach the owner would be
feasible; certainly those persons who are willing to pay their arrears within
four months after a foreclosure action would, in most cases, be willing to pay
them prior to a foreclosure. The new section, moreover, provides no relief for
a taxpayer whose foreclosed property has been assigned to a City agency. The
City's power thus to assign foreclosed property subjects the taxpayer to the very
inequities which the new section was intended to cure.
Despite these weaknesses and the preferential status retained by a City agency
assignee, the over-all purpose to attenuate the inequities heretofore existing,
where an in rem foreclosure worked an injustice, is generally accomplished.
REGULATION OF RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES OF
MOTOR VEHICLES
Chapter 633 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 adds a new article to the
New York Personal Property Law which regulates the retail installment sale
of motor vehicles with a cash sale price of $3,000 or less.' Chapter 635 amends
the New York Banking Law relative to the licensing and regulation of sales
finance companies with particular references to the sales of motor vehicles.2
Effective October 1, 1956 the form of the contract and the amount of the credit
charge for the sale of a motor vehicle must conform to the provisions of new
article IX of the Personal Property Law.3 Effective January 1, 1957 all persons
and organizations which engage in the business of a sales finance company and
which are not organized under the state Banking Law, must apply for a license
under provisions of article I1-b of the Banking Law.4
The passage of these two articles is an attempt by the Legislature to regulate
more stringently a phase of modern consumer buying which the courts were
almost powerless to control under previously existing statutes. Prior to the
passage of these acts the only statutory control of retail installment sales was
contained in sections 64-a of the Personal Property Law5 and 239-i of the Lien
1. N.Y. Personal Property Law §§ 301-11.
2. N.Y. Banking Law §§ 491-501.
3. N.Y. Personal Property Law §§ 302-03.
4. N.Y. Banking Law § 492. Banks, trust companies, private bankers, industrial banks,
and investment companies organized under the State Banking Law and authorized to accept
deposits need not apply for a license.
5. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 64-a.
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Law.6 These sections respectively set out the required forms for conditional
sales contracts and chattel mortgages referring to a sale of goods for $1,500
or less. In both the aforementioned sections it was required that separate dis-
closures be made of the different charges in the contract. No provision was made
further to protect the buyer from the unethical practices of retail sellers and
finance companies in regard to what is termed the "credit charge" or "credit
differential" which have arisen with the growth of installment buying. In many
instances the "credit charge" in installment sales contracts is much higher than
the legal rate of interest prescribed by statute for a loan or forebearance of
money.7 Yet the usury laws, as the courts have consistently interpreted them,
have never been an effective curb to these practices. 8
The New York courts, in a line of cases since 1850, have played "hands off"
in regard to credit charges in installment contracts as long as a loan or fore-
bearance of money is not involved.9 In so deciding they have almost uniformly
refused to use their power to declare such contracts void as falling within the
usury statute. The most emphatic statement of this position may be found in
the words of Judge Andrew's opinion in Meaker v. Fiero.10 "It is" he said, "a
fundamental principal governing the law of usury that it must be founded
on a loan or forebearance of money. If neither exists, there can be no usury how-
ever unconscionable the contract may be."" A review of the cases shows that
the installment contract with a credit charge contained therein is usually in-
terpreted as not involving a loan or forebearance of money, the courts considering
the credit charge to be an additional sum received by the seller in consideration
for the deferred payment of the buyer, at most resembling, but not in the least in the
nature of interest on a loan of money.' 2 There being no possibility of a valid
installment sales contract being deemed usurious, the only limit on the credit
charge is the buyer's desire to purchase the article and the seller's sense of justice
in setting a value for his deferring payment. Left to their own devices in such
transactions the seller has more often than not taken unfair advantage of the
6. N.Y. Lien Law § 239-i.
7. N.Y. General Business Law § 370.
8. In Dry Dock Bank v. The American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850), the
court held that if the value secured to the owner was the bona fide price of the thing sold,
there can be no usury, whatever the price may be. Brooks v. Avery, 4 N.Y. 225 (1850),
decided that when the owner of property receives a surplus over the price of the property
because a sale is on time and not for cash, the transaction cannot be tainted with usury.
Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Faulds, 269 App. Div. 238, 55 N.Y.S.2d 372 (3d Dep't 1945),
also held that the increase in the form of a credit charge was not interest for the seller's
forehearance on the note but rather consideration for the installment payments. See also
Jackson v. Westchester Auto Credit Corp., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1st Dep't
1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 840, 59 N.E.2d 436 (1944); Tierney v. Bajowski, 233 App. Div. 766,
250 N.Y.S. 189 (2d Dep't 1931), aft'd, 258 N.Y. 563, 180 N.E. 333 (1932); McAnsh v.
Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N.Y.S. 379 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 537, 162 N.E.
516 (1928); Archer Motor Co. v. Relin, 255 App. Div. 333, 8 N.Y.S.2d 469 (4th Dep't 1938).
9. Ibid.
10. 145 N.Y. 165, 39 N.E. 714 (1895).
11. Id. at 169.
12. See note 8 supra.
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buyer's ignorance of the intricate provisions of a contract and accomplished
a usurious end which the courts, in their prejudice for the usury laws and
by a strict interpretation of them, have let stand.13 However narrowly the courts
have construed the usury laws where a valid sale is involved, they have been
vigilant in protecting those who secure a loan at a usurious rate of interest behind
the mask of a supposed sale.14
The need for stricter regulation of the activities of finance companies and
dealers was emphasized by Governor Harriman in his 1956 Annual Message to
the New York Legislature. At that time the Governor recommended legislation
to regulate installment sales both as to form and interest rates. In so doing he
pointed out that the consumer, when buying on time, has no protection against
usury and becomes subject very often to unfair and unreasonable penalties when
the payments are not metAi s
To meet the problem partially as outlined by the Governor, the Legislature
passed chapters 633 and 635 of the New York Session Laws. Chapter 633
regulates retail installment sale contracts for the sale of motor vehicles with a
cash sale price of $3,000 or less where the vehicle is purchased for other than
commercial or business purposes or for purposes of resale.10 The contract for
such sale is prescribed and must contain a notice to the buyer of his rights under
the contract and separate disclosures of each amount comprising the total amount
payable as the time sale price. The time sale price is defined as the difference
between the cash sale price and the down payment plus the amount, if any, for
insurance and other benefits, the amount of official fees and the amount of the
credit charge. The credit charge is limited to from $7 to $13 per $100 of the cash
sale price depending upon the model of the vehicle and whether a new or used
car is being sold. Since the cash sale price determines the credit charge and one
of the most important purposes of the act is to limit this charge, the definition
of the cash sale price is of paramount importance. It is defined in the act as the
price the seller would charge if it were a cash sale and it may include charges
for accessories and their installation, charges for delivery, servicing, repairing or
improving the motor vehicle.1 7 In reference to the provision for insurance in the
13. For an extended discussion of this problem see 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 139-28S, in
particular, Raoul Berger, Usury in Installment Sales at 141-72. See also 19 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 135; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 128 (1935); Holz, The Regulation of Consumer Credit, Wis. L.
Rev. 449, 529-50 (1943) ; Comment 39 Yale L.J. 403 (1930).
14. Quackenbos v. Sayer, 62 N.Y. 344, 346 (1875) where the court quoted Lord Mans-
field: "... the most usual form of usury was a pretended sale of goods." Here, a -sale
of securities was used to cover up a usurious loan. For a recent case see Benton v. Sun
Industries, 277 App. Div. 46, 97 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Ist Dep't 1950).
15. New York State Legis. Annual 362 (1956). The Governor said, "one of the most
serious problems arises from the excessive finance and service charges in the field of install-
ment sales. There is no protection whatever for the consumer who is buying on time. Legis-
lation is needed to control such improper practices and to provide reasonable regulation of
the total rates which may be exacted from the installment buying public."
16. The Chapter specifically excludes a sale of a motor vehicle as described in the new
article from the provisions of § 64-a of the Personal Property Law and § 239-i of the Lien
Law which set forth form requirements of conditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages.
17. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 301(6).
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contract it is provided that "The buyer .. .shall have the privilege of purchas-
ing such insurance from an agent or broker of his own selection and of selecting
an insurance company acceptable to the seller. . .. .18
The act also provides that certain provisions commonly found in installment
contracts shall be unenforceable. Among these unenforceable provisions are those
which provide for acceleration of maturity of the balance without cause, for
confession of judgment and wage assignment, those which authorize a breach
of the peace in the repossession of a motor vehicle and those by which the seller
is relieved of any liability for legal remedies the buyer may have against him
under the contract.19 The provisions for refinancing of retail installment con-
tracts in the act apply to the sale of a motor vehicle for any use or with a cash
value of $3,000 or more. Such charge is limited to a flat $5 fee plus 1% interest
on descending balances. 20
A wilful violation of the provisions of this article constitutes a misdeameanor
punishable by a fine not exceeding $500. In addition, a wilful violation of the
provisions of the article regarding the form of the contract and the maximum
credit charge shall bar recovery of any credit charge of the installment contract
involved. However any failure to conform with these provisions may be corrected
within ten days after the holder of the contract is informed in writing by the
buyer of such violation and if corrected, neither seller nor holder is subject to any
penalty.2
1
In conjunction with chapter 633, and to implement its enforcement, the Legis-
lature enacted chapter 635 which employs the state's licensing power to further
regulate finance companies. It provides, in substance, that organizations which
engage in the business of a sales finance company and which are not organized
under the Banking Law, must apply for a license from the State Banking Superin-
tendent.22 The process for application is described and a basis for action by the
Superintendent on such application is laid down.
Once the license has been issued the Superintendent has the power to investi-
gate violations of the law relating to retail installment sales by the licensee and
for the causes set out in section 495 of the article, he may revoke or suspend the
license. Such action is authorized only after a hearing has been held, or without
a hearing if the licensee refuses to comply with the order of the Superintendent
to appear at the hearing. Punishment for contempt of court is authorized for
failure to comply with the order of the Superintendent. Violation of the article
is a misdemeanor and is punishable by not more than a $500 fine and imprison-
ment for not more than 6 months, in the discretion of the court.
New York was preceded in the enactment of the type of legislation contained
in chapter 633 by Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana.23 The
18. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 302(6).
19. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 302(13)-(16).
20. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 306.
21. N.Y. Personal Property Law § 307(3).
22. N.Y. Banking Law § 492.
23. Michigan Public Acts 1950 (Ex. Sess.), No. 27, p. 43; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 601-37
(1947); Wisc. Stat. § 218.01 (1939); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. §§ 6346-15 to 6346-27 (1945
Replacement); Ind. Stat. §§ 58-901 to 58-934 (1935).
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statutes of the latter two states embrace all retail installment sales and not merely
the sales of motor vehicles. That New York failed to extend the protection of the
new articles to the sale of all personalty seems to be their main fault. Mthough
the sale of motor vehicles is undoubtedly one of the largest fields of consumer
installment buying, certainly the sale of home appliances, furniture and television
sets on the installment plan are numerous enough to warrant the application of
this or a similar law. In view of the rising cost of new automobiles the ;3,000
ceiling imposed on the provisions of the law seems to be undesirably low. A more
realistic limit in keeping with these rising costs would better protect the automo-
bile buying public. Another weakness in the law, as pointed out by the Committee
on State Legislation of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, is in
its provision that the buyer's signature on the contract is conclusive proof that
there were no blank spaces at the time of signature and that a copy of the con-
tract was delivered to him.2 4
While the act represents a "giant step" in the direction of bringing the pro-
tection of the courts to the consumer who has had to resort to installment buying
it is felt that it falls far short of the optimum result in that great segments of the
public are still denied its provisions.
SUMIMARY PROCEEDINGS NOW AVAILABLE TO
REMOVE DEFAULTING VENDEE IN POSSESSION
Chapter 807 of the New York Session Laws of 1956 adds subdivision 10 to
section 1411 of the Civil Practice Act. This amendment expands the number
of situations in which summary proceedings may be utilized to recover possession
of real property by making these proceedings available to an owner-vendor
of real property against a vendee in possession holding over after default in his
contract to purchase.
At common law the usual remedy invoked by one entitled to possession
of real property against one in wrongful possession was an action in ejectmenLt
But since an action in ejectment was " . . . an expensive and dilatory proceed-
ing which in many instances amounted to a denial of justice,"' the New York
State legislature, in 1820,2 provided an additional remedy, summary proceed-
ings,3 by which, in the prescribed instances, possession of real property could
be regained quickly and inexpensively.
Because of the statutory origin and summary nature of these special pro-
ceedings, the New York courts have tended to construe the statutes narrowly.
For example, in Beach v. McGovern4 the court declared that an order entered
by the lower court was void for want of jurisdiction because of the failure of the
24. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis. at 509 (April 9, 1956).
1. Reich v. Cochran, 201 N.Y. 450, 453, 94 N.E. 1080, I0SI (1911).
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1820, c. 194.
3. For a discussion of the history of summary proceedings s5c Reich %,. Cochran, note 1
supra.
4. 41 App. Div. 381, 5S N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't 1899).
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petition to allege service of the notice in the prescribed language of the statute.
A more lenient approach to the application of the statutes was taken by the
New York Court of Appeals in Reich v. Cochran., While admitting here that
the statutes must be rather closely followed, the court said that " . . . they
should not be so hypercritically restricted as to destroy the very remedy which
they are designed to afford." 6 In contrast to the generally restrictive policy
of the judiciary, the legislature has continually sought to enlarge the scope of
the statutes' applicability by repeated additions and amendments.7  This
legislative program has created two general categories of cases in which
summary proceedings may be maintained.8 Section 1410 of the New York Civil
Practice Act is applicable where the relationship of landlord and tenant, created
by the express or implied agreement of the parties, exists.9 Section 1411 has
been construed as permitting the use of summary proceedings in certain ad-
ditional situations, even in the absence of the aforementioned relationship.' 0
As a positive requirement for the application of section 1410 of the Civil
Practice Act and its predecessor, section 2231 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the courts have demanded that the petitioner prove that the relationship of
landlord and tenant was created by the conduct or agreement of the parties.
The statutory remedy in favor of a landlord could not be resorted to in those
cases in which the relationship arose by operation of law."
The courts, therefore, when faced with the numerous attempts to remove the
vendee under section 1410, have consistently denied to the vendor the use of this
expeditious remedy.' 2 In Smith v. Keech,'3 for example, the court held that
" . .. the conventional relation of landlord and tenant does not exist in the
case of a contract of sale of real estate where the purchaser makes default in
payment, and having possession, holds over after notice and demand, but that
the relation must be established by a lease or demise of the property."'14 In-
5. 201 N.Y. 450,94 N.E. 1080 (1911).
6. Id. at 455, 94 N.E. 1080 at 1082.
7. See 2 Rasch, New York Law of Landlord and Tenant and Summary Proceedings §§
993-94 (1950).
8. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1410-11. Note that the statutory law with regard to summary
proceedings is not exclusive to the Civil Practice Act. Other statutes provide situations In
which the proceedings may be used: N.Y. Labor Law §§ 316 (3), 361; N.Y. Multple
Dwelling Laws §§ 352-53; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 976, 1146.
9. People ex rel. Ainslee v. Howlett, 76 N.Y. 574 (1879).
10. DeVita v. Pianisani, 127 Misc. 611, 217 N.Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct., App. T.
1926); Lawyers' Title & Guaranty Co. v. Tausig, 149 Misc. 594, 268 N.Y. Supp. 815 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1933).
11. Kashner v. Kapilow, 283 App. Div. 929, 130 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd,
308 N.Y. 887, 126 N.E.2d 565 (1955); Benjamin v. Benjamin, 5 N.Y. 383 (1851); Coffman
v. Gale, 248 App. Div. 25, 289 N.Y. Supp. 713 (3d Dep't 1936).
12. Norton v. Norton, 212 App. Div. 845, 207 N.Y. Supp. 886 (3d Dep't 1925); Babcock
v. Dean, 140 Misc. 800, 252 N.Y. Supp. 419 (County Ct. 1931); Burkhart v. Tucker, 27
Misc. 724, 59 N.Y. Supp. 711 (County Ct. 1899); 502 Park Avenue Corp. v. Delmonlco Hotel,
132 Misc. 502, 230 N.Y. Supp. 262 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1928).
13. 112 N.Y.S.2d 803 (County Ct. 1952).
14. Id. at 805.
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stead, said the court, " . . . the petitioner must resort to an action in ejectment
or a foreclosure of the contract in order to secure possession."'
Although the consent of the parties is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on a
court if the situation is not within the wording of the statute,'0 the parties may
by express provision in the contract of sale create the relation of landlord and
tenant, thus supplying the court in advance with jurisdiction of the subject
matter.'7 In Stevens v. Nye' s the contract provided that possession was given
to the purchaser as a tenant at sufferance, and that the purchaser would not be
deemed a vendee in possession. The Appellate Division held that, while a land-
lord-tenant relationship does not generally arise in such case, a contract for the
sale of real property could by express provision create the relationship of land-
lord and tenant between the parties pending the consummation of the contract.
The court concluded that in such case the vendor could maintain summary pro-
ceedings for the recovery of possession should the purchaser refuse to con-
summate the purchase.' 9 However, in the absence of the rare factual situation
in which such an express agreement had been effected, summary proceedings
have not been available to recover possession from a defaulting vendee -0
The present amendment 2' provides an alternative remedy whereby a vendor
may recover possession of his real property in the case of a default by a vendee
in possession. In view of the cumbersome processes heretofore available, this
simple and expeditious remedy will no longer require the vendor to resort to
extensive litigation including a possible appeal. It should be noted, however,
that the statute is self-restrictive, applicable only to contracts which are to be
performed within ninety days after execution.22
In view of the possible demand by vendees for possession in advance of the
transfer of title, this amendment seems to be a legislative recognition of the difficul-
ties which sometimes are met in the present realty field. In 1955 the legislature
had amended this sectiona2 making summary proceedings available to a vendee
against a vendor who remained in possession after having conveyed title.24 The
15. Ibid.
16. Beach v. Nixon, 9 N.Y. 35 (1853); Riesenfeld, Inc. v. R-W Realty Co., 223 App.
Div. 140, 228 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Ist Dep't 1928).
17. Mlillbrook Co. v. Gambier, 176 App. Div. 870, 163 N.Y. Supp. 102S (1st Dep't
1917), aff'd, 226 N.Y. 661, 123 N.E. 878 (1919); New York Bldg. Loan Banlkng Co. v.
Keeney, 56 App. Div. 53S, 67 N.Y. Supp. 505 (2d Dep't 1900); Murphy v. Has-elbacb, 171
N.Y. Supp. 287 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1913).
18. 283 App. Div. 666, 127 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2d Dep't 1954).
19. Id. at 666, 127 N.Y.S.2d at S.
20. See note 13 supra.
21. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 807.
22. " . . . the bill is limited to those contracts which are to be completed within ninety
days. The purpose is not to conflict with the practice that e.dsts Up-State whereby farms
are sold under long term contracts totalling as many as twenty years. It was for that rea.on,
at the request of Up-State members of the Codes Committee, that the bill was amended
to include a ninety day provision2. New York State Legislative Annual (1956) p. 34.
23. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 151.
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1411 (9).
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present amendment balances the remedies of the parties engaged in the sale of
realty. Further, the 1956 amendment is in line with the rationale underlying the
passage of the initial statute relating to summary proceedings 25 and is another
step in the trend of supplementing legal formalism with more practical and
modern procedure.
25. Reich v. Cochran, 201 N.Y. 450, 453, 94 N.E. 1080, 1081 (1911).
